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Abstract
The two acceptable forms of sales tax are the retail sales tax
and the value added tax. In principle, the only difference between
them is the application of the tax solely at the retail level with the
former, the spreading out of the impact of the tax throughout
production and distribution with the latter. In practice, there are
typically substantial differences in coverage, although these are not
necessary consequences of the differences in the two forms of tax.
The primary advantage of the value added tax is somewhat greater
ability to enforce the tax effectively, although the difference is not
nearly as great as is often claimed. The retail tax is basically
simpler. In terms of structure, cascading can more easily be avoided
with the value added tax, although cascading of the retail taxes could
be greatly reduced. There is no inherent advantage of the value added
tax in terms of breadth of coverage except in facilitating the
taxation of services by lessening cascading. Other differences
claimed between the two types of taxes are not at all inherent in the
particular forms.
In the Canadian context, use of the value added tax to replace
the manufacturers sales tax probably has some net advantage over the
retail tax in terms of intergovernmental relations and the ability to
gain substantial Federal revenue. But the advantage is much less than
often claimed.
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Conference of the Canadian Tax Foundation, Quebec City, November 1985
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THE CHOICE BETWEEN A VALUE ADDED TAX AND A RETAIL SALES TAX
John F. Due
Professor of Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Lengthy experience in a number of countries, including Canada, Switzerland,
Australia, and New Zealand, provide conclusive evidence that any sales tax
that stops short of the retail level is basically unsatisfactory and a
subject of endless controversy. As is well known, the basic difficulties
center around the inevitable tendency of firms to push various activities
beyond the point of impact of the tax, the inability to treat different
distribution systems equally for tax purposes, the inability to tax imports
and domestic goods equally, and the higher tax rate necessary for a given
revenue. In Australia and New Zealand, the difficulties have been accentuated
by the provision of numerous exemptions and multiple rates. In the develop-
ing countries, it is not operationally feasible to extend a sales tax through
the retail level, although the same problems with pre-retail taxes are encountered
in these countries as well, but in the industrialized countries the retail
sector can be included. The question remains: should the tax apply solely
at the retail level in the form of a retail sales tax (RST), or should it
take the form of a value added tax (VAT) in the pattern of the European
2
Common Market countries and most Latin American countries? The type of
VAT universally used takes the tax-credit form, and most are of the con-
sumption type.
1. John F. Due, "The Wholesale Sales Tax in Australia and New Zealand,"
Canadian Tax Journal
,
Vol. 31 (March-April 1983), pp. 20?-27.
2. For earlier discussions, see Carl S. Shoup, "Factors Bearing on an
Assumed Choice Between a Federal Retail Sales Tax and a Federal Value Added
Tax," and John F. Due, "The Case for the Use of the Retail Form of Sales Tax
in Preference to the Value Added Tax," in R . A. Musgrave, ed., Broad Based
Taxes: New Options and Sources (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1983} J Sijbren
Cnossen, "What Kind of Sales Tax? Critique of a Government Discussion Paper,"
Canadian Tax Journal
,
Vol. 23 (Nov-Dec. 1975). pp. 505-19, and " Sales Taxation^
An International Perspective," in John G. Head, ed. Taxation Issues of the 1980s,Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1982), pp. 311 -38.
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The Identity of Retail Sales Taxes and Value Added Taxes in Principle
As is by now well known, a retail tax and a VAT, with the same coverage
and rate, will yield the same revenue and produce the same pattern of distri-
bution of burden—assuming complete forward shifting of each tax. The retail
selling price of every commodity and service is equal to the sum of the
values added in production and distribution—and all value added must show
up in the retail selling price. The basic difference between the RST and
VAT relates to impact: the entire sum of the RST is collected from the
firms selling at retail—the final sellers or providers of services—whereas
the value added tax spreads the impact throughout the production and distri-
bution systems. Thus the operational aspects of the two levies differ
substantially.
Furthermore, in practice, the typical RST does differ in coverage
from the typical VAT . The coverage of the retail taxes is substantially less
broad, primarily because most services are excluded and because, particularly
in Canada, numerous exemptions are provided. The difference is one of
degree; almost all value added taxes have exemptions, and a few jurisdictions
in the United States do apply their sales taxes to most services and grant
few exemptions. But these are the exceptions. The other major difference
is that the retail sales taxes apply to a
range of inputs used in production, in some jurisdictions industrial machinery
and equipment, and in most, motor vehicles, miscellaneous supplies and
equipment and building materials. Thus there is substantial cascading—applies
tion of the tax to various elements that enter into the costs and thus prices
of the finished products as well as to the full prices of the latter. The
value added taxes typically avoid virtually all cascading. A basic issue
in this regard is: are these differences inherent in the two forms of taxes,
or a product of different circumstances under which the taxes developed?
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Relative Operational Advantages of the Two Taxes
There are significant operational advantages of each form; the supporters
of each, and particularly those of the value added tax, have tended to
exaggerate the advantages compared to the other form.
Advantages of VAT . One of the strongest advantages claimed for VAT is
the greater ease of enforcement and thus less danger of evasion, based on
the assumption that a retail sales tax is difficult to enforce.
This is the primary reason why New Zealand opted for the value added tax in
the 1984-86 proposal: " a retail sales tax is a less secure form of
revenue and prone to evasion, which is hard to detect, at anything above a
quite low rate." In the recent discussions in New Zealand, 7% is often
used as the figure above which a retail tax cannot be effectively enforced,
2
though there is no conclusive evidence of this. Norway, in changing from
the retail tax to the value added tax in 1970> likewise made the change
primarily for the same reason, though probably also influenced by the shift
to VAT in the Common Market countries.
TheE are two principal bases for this argument. First, a large portion
of the total VAT revenue--half or more—will be collected at preretail
levels; firms on the average are larger, with better records, and in many
countries less prone to evasion. If the retail tax is evaded, all tax
revenue on the transaction is lost; with the VAT, only the portion on the
retail margin (unless the retailer manages to get credit for tax paid on
purchases of goods but does not report tax on its sales) . If the entire
1. New Zealand Treasury, Goods and Services Tax , 8 November 1984, p. 12.
2. Iceland has used rates of over 20 percent; the Zimbabwe rate now
exceeds 15 percent, and the South African rate is 12 percent.
_^_
tax is on the retailer, it is argued that much greater incentive is provided for
the retailer to seek to evade--in contrast to the situation with VAT.
The Asprey Commission in Australia proposed replacement of the wholesale
sales tax by a VAT primarily on the basis of this argument.
The other element in the enforcement argument is the easier cross-checking
provided by VAT , because an obvious audit trail is provided by the tax credit
approach. Tax reported as paid to its supplier by one firm should show up
in tax paid the government by the supplier. Similar checks can be and are
made with the retail sales taxes; in the case of doubt about the accuracy
of the reported sales by a firm, check can be made upon the sales to the
firm by the suppliers and markups applied to ascertain the firm's approximate
sales volume. With neither tax are such checks made extensively because of
the time and expense involved; the only difference between the two is that
the audit trail may appear somewhat more obvious with VAT. Along the same
lines, it is argued that firms have little incentive to evade payment of tax
on purchases because they in turn receive credit for the tax against the tax
due on their sales. But this reasoning only applies to sales between registered
firms.
The defenders of VAT frequently claim too much about superiority in
enforcement. It is argued that a VAT is self-policing, because of the tax
credit feature. This is of course simple nonsense, as European experience
2
has demonstrated. The buyer and seller may both have incentive to evade
the tax. False invoices are issued by suppliers showing tax collected from
the customer when it is not actually collected, for example. This type of
behavior can be checked by audit—but audit is frequently not by any means
1. Australia, Taxation Review Committee (K. Asprey, Chairman) Full
R eport
.
Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1975*
2. H. J. Aaron, The Value Added.Tax; Lessons from Europe (Washington:
Brookings, 198l)
.
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complete. Furthermore, the self-policing argument cannot apply to sales
to final consumers.
Advantages of the Retail Tax . The operational advantages of VAT are
significant, even if less so than the supporters claim. But the concept of
a retail sales tax is much simpler; the VAT is not seriously complicated to
operate— but the basic concept is more difficult to understand, especially
by small businesses. Furthermore, firms in most of Canada (and the United
States) are familiar with the retail sales tax; they are not familiar with
VAT. This is not at all a conclusive argument against VAT--but it is relevant.
The number of registered firms will be somewhat less with the retail
sales tax—assuming comparable overall coverage of the tax—but not nearly
as much as might be anticipated, only about 10 percent less according to a
2
United States Treasury estimate. There are far more retailers than there
are manufacturing and wholesale firms. Furthermore, many manufacturers and
wholesalers are registered as they make some retail sales, and even if they
do not, they usually must have a registration number to be able to buy
materials and goods for resale tax free.
While the number of firms will not differ greatly, the tasks of the
individual firms will. Under RST, a firm must keep records only of gross, exempt,
and taxable sales; with a VAT, each firm must also keep a record of tax
paid on purchases. Thus a manufacturing firm, under a retail tax, must
merely report its small element of retail sales and ensure that its regis-
tration number is quoted on purchases of materials and other conditionally
exempt goods. With VAT, the firm must apply tax to all its sales, keep
records of the amounts, record the tax paid on purchases (or the figure of
taxable purchases) and pay the difference. This is not an insuperable task
—
but it is not negligible. In Australia, although the Asprey Commission had
1. U.S. Treasury. Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic
Growth, Vol. 3 (Washington: U.S. Treasury 1984), p. 32.
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recommended VAT
,
the government rejected it in favor of the retail sales
tax, on the grounds of the vast amount of paperwork that would result from
VAT, a fear greatly exaggerated.
Apart from the paperwork issue there are two other operational problems
with the VAT that are largely avoided by the retail sales tax. The first is
the need with VAT to allocate inputs between the production of taxable and
exempt goods and services—assuming that there are exemptions, as, rightly
or wrongly, there are almost certain to be. A firm can take credit for tax
paid on inputs for production of taxable or zero rated commodities such as
exports, but not for exempt goods. This allocation problem is a serious
nuisance under any circumstances, but it is particularly troublesome with
purchases such as computers used in the production of both taxable and
exempt goods.
A second problem is that of the need for massive refunds, primarily on
export transactions. Universally, under a VAT, export transactions are zero
rated; thus all taxes accumulated in their prices on purchased inputs to
produce them are refunded at export. For example, tax will apply to steel
when sold to fabricators; when the fabricators sell the steel for export,
they are entitled to a credit for the tax paid on the inputs. But if most
of their business is exporting, they will have little tax liability, and
thus a refund must be paid. Handling of refunds is always somewhat complex,
and if nothing more, the source of substantial nuisance work.
Another problem arises from the breaking of the daisy chain of the VAT by
exemption of certain activities—a problem which the RST avoids. If certain
types of activity are excluded from the registration requirement for operational
or other reasons, the purchasers from these firms cannot receive credit for
tax paid on their purchases against tax due on their sales, as they do not
pay any, even though tax has entered into costs and prices at earlier stages.
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When the commodities are sold by the firms purchasing from them, tax applies
in full, without credit for tax that had applied prior to the exempted
activity. Take for example, farmers. While a few governments register them
as taxpaying firms under VAT, and New Zealand proposed to do so, most do not.
Therefore tax paid by farmers on purchases of inputs do not become a credit
against tax due on sales of the farm products by purchasers from farmers.
Thus, unless some arbitrary formula is used reflecting an estimate of the
typical tax element in farm product prices, as some European countries do,
it becomes necessary to zero rate major farm inputs—feed, seed, fertilizer,
farm machinery. But this type of exclusion is foreign to the general
structure of a VAT—whereas it is a common element in the typical RST.
Similar problems arise with small firms if they are excluded from the
registration requirement.
Optimal Coverage of the Tax
The other general issue in the selection of the optimal form of sales
tax relates to coverage of the tax. Optimal ity in coverage of a sales tax,
if it is to be a truly general consumption tax, requires that all consumption
expenditures on goods and services be taxed, and that there be no cascading;
the tax applies only to the final selling prices with no net burden on any
inputs. If the former requirement is not met, the tax is not truly a
general consumption levy and produces discrimination and excess burden; if
the latter is not met, the tax will not be uniform on all consumer spending,
and will create distortions in production and distribution methods and
organization.
Cascading . It is now generally agreed that cascading can be avoided
more effectively with a VAT than with an RST. With the latter, sales of
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various inputs are made tax free upon presentation by the buyer of a certifi-
cate or the equivalent indicating use for specified business purposes. To
prevent abuse through purchasing tax free for consumption use, audit is
necessary, and this requires checking both the seller and the buyer. This
can be done and is done to some extent under a retail sales tax. But it is
slow and expensive. By contrast, under VAT, all sales to businesses and
consumers are subject to tax. Check on the business buyer is needed to
ensure that the purchases on which the tax is taken as a credit against tax
due on sales are actually used for business purposes. But only the purchaser
need be audited, not the supplier. Furthermore, the supplier does not have
to distinguish between sales made for business and nonbusiness use. The
difference between the two forms of sales tax is not as great as some persons
argue, but there appears to be some net advantage for VAT. Avoidance of
cascading was the major reason Sweden switched from a retail tax to a value
added tax, and this consideration has influenced other countries as well
—
including France, the originator of use of the value added tax in 1 95^—55 •
It should be noted that with a retail tax firms could be allowed to
make all purchases tax free and account for tax themselves on taxable
purchases, as many states do with certain large firms such as public utilities
or manufacturers, and West Virginia does with most all firms. But most govern-
ments are reluctant to do so, fearing substantial loss of revenue in
view of their very limited audit coverage.
Perhaps the major difference between the two forms of tax on the issue
of cascading is not what is feasible but what the precedent is. As noted
the countries using VAT typically, but not universally, allow credit for tax
paid by registered firms on all inputs (the main exceptions are in South
America). By contrast, the retail sales tax users— including the states
-9-
and provinces and Iceland, have made no serious attempt to exclude business
inputs and thus to avoid cascading. Because of the problems of doing so
completely most jurisdictions have limited the exclusion to sales for
resale, materials and parts physically incorporated into the final products,
and in some instances fuel and industrial machinery, and farm feed, seed,
and fertilizer. Otherwise inputs are taxed, with no serious attempt to
exclude them. In fact many jurisdictions do not accept the principle that
inputs should be excluded from tax, partly because it is politically unat-
tractive to shift tax burden to individual consumers from business firms— even
though such a shift is essential for optimality in production.
Scope of Coverage . The other attribute of structure in which the VAT
is claimed to have an advantage is in breadth of coverage. VAT functions
best if there are no exemptions or zero rated transactions (except exports).
Exemptions are more difficult to implement operationally with VAT , since the
exemption almost of necessity must be carried through all levels of production
and distribution, with consequent problems of record keeping and separation
of inputs and tax on them between production of taxable and exempt goods.
Thus exemptions are easier with the retail tax—but this in turn encourages
exemptions, to the determinant of optimality of the tax. Exemptions breed
other exemptions, under what may be called the termite principle. With
VAT, governments have been less inclined to provide exemptions; VAT is more
widely accepted as a general consumption tax. But there is little fundamental
difference between the two taxes on this score. The main difference has
been in practice. Retail taxes can be applied to all goods and services
as well as can a VAT, with some exceptions. Most retail sales taxes were
not so designed. They originated as taxes on commodities, and few have been
extended to services beyond transient housing—hotels and motels. But they
-1 Cl-
ean be—as experience in New Mexico, Hawaii and South Dakota have
demonstrated.
In the field of taxation of services, however, VAT offers one advan-1-
tage: the greater ease of avoiding cascading. Many services are rendered
for hoth production and consumption purposes, and thus under the usual
structure of the retail sales taxes, there is no means for excluding from
tax those which are inputs in business activity; there is no "sale for
resale." The only feasible method of exclusion is to allow registered
purchasers to make all purchases of services tax free and account for tax on
those acquired for taxable purposes. This is not impossible, but
has not been tried.
Thus the difference between the two forms of tax in terms of coverage
is by no means basic to the type of tax; it is a product of a different
development of the two forms over the years. It may be easier in Canada
to attain broad coverage with a VAT
—
given the nature of the usual pro-
vincial retail sales tax.
With both forms of tax, there are several areas in which ideal coverage
is difficult to attain. The first is financial institutions, the issues of
taxing them being so controversial that the EEC countries exempt them.
There are two problems. These institutions provide a number of services
for which they do not charge—as for example, free checking. But the more
basic issue is the question of whether the payment of nonbusiness interest
is a consumption expenditure. If it is so regarded, all interest charges
by financial institutions would justifiably be made taxable under VAT,
those to nonregistered entities under a retail sales tax. Interest on
loans made by individuals of course would not be reached, and there would
be some economic distortion. This would not matter with VAT on loans to
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registered firms "because of the tax credit feature, and this type of loan
to individuals is not very significant. The treatment of insurance companies
is even more complicated under either tax.
The second area is housing. It is not desirable to tax rental housing
if owner-occupied housing is free of tax, "but the latter cannot "be taxed
operationally and would encounter serious political objection. Even the
former is not easy because there are many small landlords not regularly
engaged in business. Construction or sale of new housing can be taxed—but
this does not reach existing housing. The problems are similar with VAT and
RST.
Thirdly, the treatment of farmers is troublesome. To register all
farmers under VAT or RST materially increases the number of registered firms,
many of them small. While a few European countries register all farmers
and New Zealand proposes to, most countries quite justifiably are not willing
to do so. Under a retail sales tax, farmers are not registered unless they
are regularly selling at retail. The usual practice is to exempt major
farm inputs, although some are taxed and thus some cascading results.
With VAT, exemption of major inputs is contrary to the general structure of
a VAT, and some cascading would be inevitable, even with the technique
used by a few European countries of allowing registered purchasers of farm
products to assume that a certain percent of the purchase price represents
cumulated tax.
Finally, and of less concern, is the tax treatment of second hand goods.
If VAT applies, is any credit to be allowed for the tax originally paid when
the good was previously purchased? With a retail sales tax, is the tax to
apply to the full price—as it usually does? There is no simple optimal
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answer with either tax, in part because of lack of knowledge of the extent
to which the selling prices reflect tax previously applied.
Intergovernmental Aspects
In a Federal country, a major consideration affecting the choice between
the two forms of sales tax is that of intergovernmental relations. There
are both operational and political aspects to this question. If the Federal
government were to levy a value added tax in the situation in which the
provinces continue to use retail sales taxes, all business firms would be
confronted with two different types of sales taxes, as are manufacturers
currently. This is obviously a nuisance and source of expense to business
firms and of unnecessary enforcement costs. A Federal retail tax piggybacked
onto the provincial taxes is impossible in light of the variations in the
provincial levies. If the provinces were willing to piggyback their retail
taxes on the Federal and to adapt their structures to the Federal (not
necessarily with uniform rates), this system could function satisfactorily.
The issue is: would they do so? With a value added tax, which must be at
the Federal level so long as the tax credit method is used, the provinces
likewise could piggyback their own VATs. But the net effect would be to
increase the relative amounts of sales tax received by the provinces in
which manufacturing is concentrated. Or, the provinces could piggyback
only on to the retail transactions—but this would create a variety of
complications
.
The basic political issue is: What would be the relative overall
reaction of the provinces to Federal use of VAT or RST? Use of the value
added tax would involve less obvious intervention into a major tax field of
the provinces. A decade ago, when the general issue was being considered,
some of the provinces feared that the provinces would be blamed for additional
tax if a Federal levy, either at or through the retail level, were imposed.
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Separate Quotation of Tax and Shifting
Some of the debate over the merits of the two forms of tax has assumed
that while the retail tax would "be quoted separately from the prices of the
goods, a value added tax would be concealed in the prices to final consumers.
Whether this concealment is an advantage or disadvantage depends upon the
philosophy accepted about public awareness of tax burdens. But a value
added tax is not necessarily concealed in prices, and a retail sales tax is
not necessarily quoted separately. With VAT, the tax must be quoted
separately on sales to registered firms under the usual tax credit approach;
it is therefore simpler to have the tax quoted separately on all sales,
so that sellers do not have to distinguish between sales to registered firms
and those to individual consumers.
A related issue is that of completeness of forward shifting—the
assumption typically made. It is likely that with either form of tax there
will be some deviation from exact shifting, although in the typical imperfect
market, requiring separate quotation of tax will likely increase the extent
of exact shifting by encouraging uniformity of action amont the competing
firms. Under VAT, shifting must take place at a greater number of steps
in the production and distribution system, and thus there is probably some-
what less assurance of exact shifting, but there is less cascading.
The Money Machine Argument
A major objection to VAT, on the part of persons who wish to curtail
growth in public spending, is that a VAT is in effect a money machine—that
it can in practice yield far more additional revenue than a retail sales
tax. The argument is that a retail tax, concentrated at the retail level
1. Because of some cascading in the usual retail sales tax, not all
the tax is clearly revealed to the purchaser- of the final product,
even though the tax is quoted separately.
-1^-
and typically visible to the consumer, will encounter greater resistance
than a VAT, collected at various stages in production and distribution,
and, commonly, hidden from the consumer.
As noted, a VAT can be made as visible to the public as an RST. The
remainder of the money machine argument is debatable, on the basis of com-
parison between the two forms of tax, but it is rather widely accepted.
Conclusion
In general both the VAT and the RST are acceptable forms of sales tax,
whereas the manufacturing, wholesale, and turnover taxes are not. There is
actually not a great deal of difference between VAT and RST in terms of rela-
tive merits, so long as the structure can be established independently of existing
tax structures—especially the provincial retail taxes. Various countries
have followed different routes in moving from their unsatisfactory sales
taxes. The government of New Zealand opted for a value added tax, to become
effective October 1, 1986; the Australian government, in the same period,
selected the retail form of tax, overriding the report of the tax reform
committee which had proposed VAT. Ultimately in the summer of 1985 Australia
abandoned its plans for a retail tax, primarily because of strong objection
in the governing Labor party to the distributional effects, an issue unrelated
to the choice between VAT and the retail tax. The Swiss government twice
selected the value added tax to replace its present wholesale sales tax (a
portion of which is collected at retail), but the voters rejected the proposal.
In the Canadian context, there is probably some net advantage to the
value added tax for a relatively high rate Federal levy, primarily because
of the greater feasibility of avoiding cascading, which hampers exports and
is objectionable in other ways. There is also the possibility of attaining
-15-
"broader coverage, for practical rather than fundamental reasons. Both
types of tax will work; "both encounter much the same problems. And many
of the arguments made with respect to relative merits of each have in
fact no validity.
JFD/sl/lO/85
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